In defence of a logic for ‘because’

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (2):160-171 (2016)
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Abstract

The present author developed a calculus for the logic of ‘because’. In a recent paper in this journal, it has been claimed that the central inference rules for the logic are invalid and that the intuition upon which the rules are based is not accounted for. This note criticises these arguments and presents an independent argument in favour of the rules used in the logic.

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Benjamin Schnieder
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics.Michaela Markham McSweeney - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):156-170.
Disjunction and the Logic of Grounding.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):567-587.
Explanation impossible.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):559-576.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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