Abstract

In this article, I examine the view that there is a human right to democracy, and consider why we should regard this issue as decisive in solving the problems of foreign interference in the protection of human rights. I also note that there has been almost no discussion about the holder of the human right to democracy, that is, who is to hold this right. After comparing John Rawls’ argument against the human right to democracy and Thomas Christiano’s argument for it and showing similarities and critical differences among their arguments, I insist that we ought to be sensitive when proclaiming that democracy—be it a minimally egalitarian democracy or a more exacting one—is a universal value. We have sufficient cause to consider carefully not only the political circumstances but also the political infrastructure of the country before we proceed to an even limited intervention in the name of the protection of a human right to democracy. If the human right to democracy is not just a right to vote, but a right to the whole process of establishment and enjoyment of democracy, it should be understood as a group right that pertains to a human population that legitimately claims political self-determination. Any human population that insists on the democratic self-determination of their political will is both able and entitled to establish and administer democratic institutions, regardless of the diversity of its ascribed or cultural characteristics. The establishment of such a group with a firm political identity should be considered as the political infrastructure to claim and exercise the human right to democracy.