Abstract

The concepts embedded in the tripartite division of being - necessity, possibility, and impossibility - are posed in logic in relation to propositions. In philosophy, these three-fold concepts are used to divide existents into two types, the necessary being and the possible being, and, following it, to divide non-beings into two types: possible beings and impossible beings. This paper demonstrates that, based on the theory of the principiality of existence, the above divisions are refuted, and indicates that each being is a necessary being; each concept is a possible being, and each non-being is an impossible being. Even the distinction between the "by essence" and "by another" considerations of the tripartite division of being in attributing existence to the three groups of existent, concept, and non-existent cannot create a change in the above analysis. In this way, employing the concepts of the tripartite division of being lacks the expected efficiency in classifying existents. The Transcendent Philosophy has replaced them with the concepts of indigent possibility and ontological richness, which will be discussed in this paper.