Philosophy as the behaviorist views it?
In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.),
Experimental Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264-282 (
2014)
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Abstract
This chapter discusses future directions which the current developments within philosophy might take. It does so on the background of historical parallels to the controversy around experimental philosophy.
Historical debates in psychology and economics contain astonishing similarities to today’s discussions in philosophy. After a brief historical overview, four central criticisms which experimental philosophy is subject to are systematically reviewed. It is shown that three of these are not specifically philosophical. Rather, they neccessarily accompany and drive every introduction of experimental methods to a discipline. Only the question if experimental methods can actually capture the objects of philosophical research remains as a – weak – candidate for a specifically philosophical problem. This question is discussed separately.
Finally, a constructively critical pluralism of methods is advocated and more serenity demanded: Introducing experimental methods to philosophy is an experiment itself. We will simply have to wait and see if it succeeds.