Edmund Burke and the Natural Law [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 9:181-184 (1959)
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Abstract

The purpose of this book is to show that “far from being an enemy of Natural Law, Burke was one of the most eloquent and profound defenders of Natural Law morality and politics in Western civilization”. Professor Stanlis rightly points out that Burke was for too long treated as a utilitarian in politics, and he blames such writers as Morley, Stephen and Vaughan, who were mainly responsible for this interpretation. He might have added that Burke himself must bear part of the blame: is he not famous for his rejection, in his American speeches, of all appeals to “abstract” or natural rights? “I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them …”. “The question with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people miserable; but whether it is not your interest to make them happy”. Such phrases sound rather like utilitarianism; and the impression is strengthened by Burke’s famous denunciation of the whole “Rights of Man” school in his Reflections on the Revolution in France: “How can any man claim, under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its existence? Rights which are absolutely repugnant to it? … In the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction.… The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false.… The rights of men in government are their advantages.… The body of the community … has no right inconsistent with virtue, and the first of all virtues, prudence. Men have no right to what is not reasonable, and to what is not for their benefit. …”

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