Jarvie’s Rationalitätstreit

In Raphael Sassower & Nathaniel Laor (eds.), The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. Springer Verlag. pp. 241-255 (2019)
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Abstract

As a Popperian, Ian C. Jarvie takes falsifiability to be a defining characteristic of rationality. This suggests that any disagreement about the truth or falsity of a particular belief that can be settled by further evidence should be rationally resolvable, at least in the following sense. Niceties about probabilities aside, one should be able to specify under what conditions, that is, given what evidence, one would surrender that belief. Put another way, if a belief will not be given up no matter what evidence one might ever confront, then this establishes that belief as mere dogma.

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Paul A. Roth
University of California, Santa Cruz

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