Distinctive human social motivations in a game-theoretic framework

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):715-716 (2005)
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I discuss implications of Tomasello et al's hypothesis that humans exhibit distinctive collective intentionality for game-theoretic approaches to modeling human evolution. Representing the hypothesis game-theoretically forces a question about whether it implies only distinctively human motivations or both distinctive motivations and distinctive cognitive capacities for representation of intentions. I also note that the hypothesis explains uniquely human ideological conflict and invites game-theoretic modeling of this.



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