Abstract
There is a recent popular reconstruction of Wittgenstein's thinking about animal minds, according to which animals and humans share a set of expressive abilities, prior to, and independent of, the onset of linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities; a reconstruction that in turn entails a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities, in adult humans. This paper contends that the reconstruction is implausible and at odds with Wittgenstein's thinking, regarding both the developing minds of children and the minds of non-linguistic animals. Instead, it argues that Wittgenstein's thinking is shaped by an anthropological outlook, according to which linguistic abilities signal the existence of a distinctive human form of life, within which animals do not belong, but into which children are progressively introduced. As a result, there is neither a shared set of expressive abilities in animals, children and adult humans; nor a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities in humans