Abstract

My efforts in this dissertation are directed toward examining, critically, a certain Realist theory of perception; D. M. Armstrong's Direct Realist theory. Armstrong's is a Direct Realist theory of perception due to the fact that, on his theory, one never perceives anything but physical existents; that is, non-mental entities of some sort. On some other Realist theories, with which Armstrong's theory is to be contrasted, one perceives physical existents, but only by way of the direct or immediate perception of non-physical sense impressions. Sense impressions are, clearly, somethings which Armstrong wishes to avoid. ;In order for Armstrong's theory to be successful he must first give some account of sensory error--delusion and illusion--which does not make use of sense impressions. Most traditional arguments against Direct Realism focus on its inadequacy in this regard. But Armstrong analyzes sensory error as the acquiring of false beliefs that one is perceiving. And, after considering several arguments to the contrary, I find this analysis to be both defensible and without any implicit or explicit appeal to sense impressions. I therefore consider it acceptable, though only provisionally, as the analysis makes use of the notion of 'perception,' which has yet to have been analyzed. ;Armstrong's analysis of perception appears to me to run quickly into difficulty. As Armstrong accounts for perception, it is the acquiring of knowledge of particular facts about the physical world, by means of the senses. But as he has given it, this definition can be shown to be circular. This, obviously, is a major flaw in his analysis of perception, but the problem carries over to his analysis of sensory error as well, since the latter makes use of the notion of perception. ;In the dissertation I remove, satisfactorily I think, the circularity from Armstrong's account of perception, without also removing its character. Most analyses of perception are given in terms of the experience of objects or states of affairs, one supposedly has when perceiving. But for Armstrong, perception is non-experiential; it is simply the acquiring of knowledge or true belief about the physical world. ;Having made explicit the novel character of Armstrong's account, I consider his reason for offering such an uncustomarily non-experiential analysis of perception. . . . UMI