Eduardo Rivera-López
Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz
Eduardo Lopez
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the "Dependence Claim": A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00607.x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
The Realm of Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Distinctive Duress.Craig K. Agule - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1007-1026.
When Ignorance Excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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