Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):762-763 (1973)
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Abstract

In this work Peters presents an interpretive summary of the metaphysical position which he considers the foremost attempt to radically reinterpret the classical philosophical notions of substance, causality and deity—the theory of fact-as-such or of concreteness, which has been critically and constructively developed in the work of Charles Hartshorne. This study is valuable as a guide to Hartshorne’s philosophical speculations and is essentially up-to-date. Peters has included in his analyses a formerly unpublished manuscript of Hartshorne’s which has since been incorporated into Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. He begins with a short biographical essay on Hartshorne; he moves immediately into a discussion of methodology, specifically Hartshorne’s position on unrestrictive existential statements. From this methodological base, Peters turns to a consideration of the panpsychist interpretation of events, the doctrine of the ultimate coincidence of temporal and modal categories in the chapter on creativity, the dipolar conception of deity, the notion of inclusive contrast and its significance for the distinction of subject and object, and to the aesthetic foundation of speculative thought as evidenced in Hartshorne’s continual attempt to resolve the problem of unity within diversity. The last chapter in the book, entitled "A Critical Look at Crucial Axioms" contains an overview of axioms which Peters considers essential to an understanding of Hartshorne’s philosophy and critical consideration of Hartshorne’s principle of positivity, the principle which served as the focus of discussion in the earlier chapter on methodology.

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