Abstract

Mullā Ṣadrā offers two different views regarding the references of the philosophical secondary intelligibles. According to the first view, philosophical secondary intelligibles only have external foundations for abstraction (mansha al-intizāʿ) and no external counterparts (mā bi iza ͗). And according to the second view, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā’s final view, these concepts have external counterparts which exist with the very existence of their subjects. This view faces some problems: First, Mullā Ṣadrā’s reason for the existence of these concepts’ external counterparts begs the question and is therefore invalid. The argument Ṭabāṭabāʾī offers in his commentary on Mullā Ṣadrā’s argument is also flawed since it presupposes a point that is more difficult to accept than the conclusion and so would naturally be rejected by the other side. Second, the purported counterpart’s mode of existence is not clear. Third, it is not clear by virtue of what difference between quidditative and philosophical concepts the former but not the latter have independent counterparts. The method employed in this paper is library research and rational analysis.