Abstract

The study works out a distinction between a non-epistemic and an epistemic notion of cause. It is based on the concept of a background condition. A background condition for a causal law from A to B is a condition that is causally relevant for B, but that is not included in A because of our ignorance. ;Non-epistemic causal laws--laws of nature--are characterized as causal laws that are closed, ie. that are incompatible with the existence of background conditions. Laws of nature are contrasted with scientific hypotheses and, broadly speaking, the study accepts the idea that the latter are open, ie. that they are compatible with the existence of background conditions. A similar distinction is then made on the singular level. Non-epistemic singular causal statements are called producing-cause statements: they express a relation between space-time regions. Epistemic singular causal statements are called explanatory causal statements: they express a relation between facts. ;The study provides a non-epistemic version for the covering law account of producing-cause statements. The definition is worked out in quantified modal logic and it uses a theory of causal systems that is developed in the study. ;Finally the basic duality of the study is used to defend the regularity theory of causal hypotheses. It is argued that predicate logic is here a strong enough formal language and must not be expanded into a modal logic that invokes the concept of physical necessity. ;The basic conclusion of the study is that the theory of causality is intensional, while the theory of causal explanation is extensional