Plantinga on the Epistemic Implications of Naturalism

Abstract

In the final chapter of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Planting a presents an “evolutionary argument against naturalism”. According to this argument, the conjunction of naturalism and evolution cannot be rationally believed by anyone who understands its epistemic implications. In this paper, I argue that if Plantinga’s evolutionary argument is sound, it follows that perceptive naturalists have no propositional knowledge. Since it is plausible that perceptive naturalists do have some propositional knowledge, I infer that the evolutionary argument is unsound. However, I conclude the paper with the suggestion that even if EA is unsound, it may still provide important insights about the epistemic shortcomings of naturalism.

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David Reiter
Erskine College

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Citations of this work

Anti-Naturalistic Arguments From Reason.Graham Oppy - 2022 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 70 (1):15-35.

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