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Content, mode, and self-reference
In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-63 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that the self-referential component which Searle rightly detects in the truth-conditions of perceptual judgments comes from the perceptual ‘mode' and is not an aspect of the ‘content' of the judgment, contrary to Searle's claim.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The no-self alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality.Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):183-203.
An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
References found in this work
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1983 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry.
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