Moral Change and Social Relativism

Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):139-158 (1994)
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Abstract

I could not write the essay I hoped to write. I hoped to write about cultural pluralism and moral epistemology by assuming that the first is the case and exploring what implications this may have for the second. But I soon realized that I do not know what cultural pluralism is. I do not mean that I have just belatedly discovered that the phrase “cultural pluralism” is used in different ways on different occasions. I mean that I realized that I myself did not know in what sense the phrase may be used which makes it relevant to the inquiry suggested by the general topic of this volume. So the following reflections are based on one assumption: The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths

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Joseph Raz
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Towards a new epistemology of moral progress.Patrick Stokes - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1824-1843.
Common morality and moral reform.K. A. Wallace - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (1):55-68.

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References found in this work

Rethinking Reason.Jean Hampton - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):219 - 236.

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