Beta-Conversion and the Being Constraint

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):253-286 (2021)
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Abstract

Modal contingentists face a dilemma: there are two attractive principles of which they can only accept one. In this paper I show that the most natural way of resolving the dilemma leads to expressive limitations. I then develop an alternative resolution. In addition to overcoming the expressive limitations, the alternative picture allows for an attractive account of arithmetic and for a style of semantic theorizing that can be helpful to contingentists.

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Agustin Rayo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Sortals, Timelessness, and Transcendental Truth.Penelope Mackie - 2021 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):287-307.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
Ontological anti-realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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