Brentano’s Psychology and the Problem of Existential Import

Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17:121-131 (1968)
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FRANZ BRENTANO has often been considered guilty of the‘psychologism’ which Edmund Husserl, his pupil, attacked. The charge is justified in only a limited sense: Brentano is dealing not with intentional acts but rather with intentional objects. His concern is directed, among other things, to certain logical and ontological problems such as those raised by a Meinong, even if Brentano makes use of psychological insight in order to shed light on them.



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