The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy
Abstract
In a response to John Rawls’s 1993 article entitled, “The Law of Peoples,” Karl-Otto Apel argues that the concept of “overlapping consensus” is not sufficient for a basis or foundation for global justice. Apel makes the claim that when Rawls transfers the problem of justification from a general moral conception of justice to overlapping consensus the “weight of justification” is transferred to a “freestanding” conception of justice. To the extent that it does this, Rawls’s theory fails to show why a freestanding conception of justice ought to be acceptable. In order to do so, Apel believes that, since citizens’ reason must be addressed, the weight of justification for a freestanding view must be based on a philosophical consensus theory. This would not mean that the need of a factual consensus would be dispensed with. Rather, it would mean that a freestanding view would be grounded philosophically “by a conception of an ideal consensus that serves as a regulative principle for searching and also for questioning an overlapping consensus.”