Abstract
R. M. HARE takes the following view of the task of moral philosophy, "The function of moral philosophy—or at any rate the hope with which I study it—is that of helping us think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought is expressed." The purpose of this essay is to show that this restriction of ethics to the logical dimensions of moral discourse is grounded in an excessively narrow conception of the resources of human reason. Specifically, I shall argue that a more thoroughgoing grasp of these resources shows that reason has the capacity to move beyond such a purely logical task and to function as a normative source of moral demands. Central to the argument is the contention that the capacities of reason are restricted neither to the discovery of facts, nor to the opening of human discourse to the demands of logic, but include also the capacity to function as a principle constitutive of human agency as capable of self-awareness. I shall try to show that this latter capacity enables reason to play a morally normative role in human life. The argument will be divided into three major components, beginning with a brief expository sketch of Hare’s position aimed at providing the problematic framework for my argument by stating the essentials of his case against naturalism and for prescriptivism. The second component will describe the reflective capacity of reason and will point out that this capacity is at work in Hare’s writings. Finally, the third component will be directed toward showing how reflectivity is capable of founding a normative ethics.