Intuition and Ideality [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):415-417 (1988)
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Abstract

What distinctive philosophical position unites Whitehead, Heidegger, Carnap, J. L. Austin, Quine, van Fraassen, and Derrida, among many others? According to David Weissman, they all assert or presuppose intuitionism, as he calls it, or the view that "everything real should be present or presentable, in its entirety, to the mind." An implausible set of bedfellows, perhaps, yet Weissman argues persuasively that they are indeed intuitionists, and that "we as philosophers have lost sight of this most fundamental truth about our history and procedures." We have lost sight of it because we combine "disinterest in the history of philosophy... with the assumption that our method is neutral." Thus, "we renounce [intuitionism] even as we practice it," just as, one might add, many renounce Cartesianism even as they remain profoundly influenced by Descartes.

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