From Boredom to Authenticity Bubbles: The Implication of Boredom-Induced Social Media Use for Individual Autonomy

Philosophy and Technology 37 (2):1-16 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that boredom can be an important experience that contributes to personal autonomous agency by providing authentic motivation, and that strategies of social media providers to bind users’ attention to their platforms undermine this authenticity. As discussed in social epistemology and media ethics for a while now, such strategies can lead to so-called epistemic or filter bubbles. Our analysis of the relation between boredom and social media use focuses on a similarly impairing effect of social media on users’ autonomy, which we call authenticity bubbles.

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Frodo Podschwadek
Academy of Sciences and Literature | Mainz

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References found in this work

Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - Philosophy 64 (250):571-572.
Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.

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