Thinking about Judgment with Shakespeare

Philosophy and Literature 41 (1A):142-154 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What sort of thing is judgment?1 Looking at the sense of "judgment" as a human capacity as opposed to the result of exercising that capacity, whether in ordinary behavior or in some legal or political framework, I intend to offer a definition proposal for the term and then to discuss how judgment so defined operates in human behavior, what constitutes good judgment, whether it can be cultivated, and, if so, how. The example I will focus on is drawn from Shakespeare's character Benedick in Much Ado About Nothing as he decides to fall in love with Beatrice. Postulating that Shakespeare is a shrewd analyst of human psychology, I hope to show that his portrayal will illuminate the concept of judgment and, conversely...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Fall of Judgment.Eric Louis Weislogel - 1995 - Dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University
Legal Judgment as a Philosophical Archetype.Giovanni Tuzet - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (2):275-288.
Critique of judgment.Immanuel Kant - 1790 - New York: Barnes & Noble. Edited by J. H. Bernard.
The Elusiveness of Arendtian Judgment.Bryan Garsten - 2007 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 74:1071-1108.
The elusiveness of Arendtian judgment.Bryan Garsten - 2007 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (4):1071-1108.
In sensible judgement.Max Deutscher - 2013 - Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
In Sensible Judgment.Max Deutscher - 2012 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 16 (1):203-225.
Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-20

Downloads
6 (#1,456,990)

6 months
1 (#1,464,097)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references