In human beings, choice and action require a cause of a different kind to link them. Otherwise a vicious regress breaks out. This is cause in the sense of end or purpose. It stands between choice and action, making a reciprocative causal triad. Yet apart from our projects, this triad obtains in nature too, and for the same reason. In reproduction, as in choice and action, means are activities that are directed to the replication of pre-existing patterns as ends. Further, when agents are taken not as active but as capable of certain activities, the latter are not means as in reproduction but themselves ends. In this sense, it can be said that persons have a natural end as persons, a thesis for which two arguments are proposed
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0019-0365
DOI 10.5840/ipq20084824
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,316
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Natural Law, End, And Virtue In Aquinas.John Peterson - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24:397-413.
Must New Worlds Also Be Good?Robert Grant - 1995 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 38 (1-2):123 – 141.
Libertarian Choice.Stewart Goetz - 1997 - Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):195-211.
Action in Signs.Andres Luure - 2009 - Sign Systems Studies 37 (1/2):270-280.
Living with Reason.Ross Poole - 1992 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):199 – 217.


Added to PP index

Total views
22 ( #515,634 of 2,519,278 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #407,861 of 2,519,278 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes