Extended Knowledge Overextended?

In Karyn L. Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Springer Nature. pp. 191-233 (2021)
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Abstract

It is undeniable that computer technology has had a major impact on how we engage enquiry. We use computer devices to store information that helps us in our daily lives—just think of the contacts on your phone and whatever calendar app you might use to keep track of your schedule. Furthermore, people enjoy easy and quick access to a wide range of reliable online resources such as Nature, Reuters, and Encyclopedia Britannica through their laptops or smartphones. Powerful search engines such as Google open up the door to swaths of information, enabling people easily to acquire a wide range of true beliefs through reliable means about all kinds of subject matters. However, what is the status of such true beliefs? In particular, once beliefs cease to be occurrent, do we still have non-occurrent beliefs, and, if true and reliably sustained, do they still qualify as knowledge? If they do, we would have cases of extended belief and knowledge, as these computer devices go beyond onboard capacities such as perception and memory. However, unlike our beliefs and desires, many information-storing apps and resources do not have the capacity automatically to “update” their information in light of new information. Moreover, wouldn’t extended belief and knowledge lead to massive cognitive bloat—an unpalatable explosion of belief and knowledge completely detached from an ability naturally to recall the relevant information? It would seem so given the wide variety of storage repositories and devices at one’s fingertips. Doesn’t cognitive bloat threaten to undermine the notion of expertise? Is it really possible to become an expert on a given topic by simply and easily looking up information via one’s smartphone and saving it? And where, now, would we place cognitive effort—steps taken by individuals to commit details to memory, to apply knowledge, to deliberate, and to assess and reflect? In “Extended Knowledge Overextended?”, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Jens Christian Bjerring offer a comprehensive discussion of extended belief and knowledge. They criticize two recent attempts to mitigate concerns about cognitive bloat by arguing that their effectiveness is contingent on the current state of technology—in particular, the fact that computer devices are currently external to us. However, if computer devices seamlessly integrated with our own onboard capacities—the so-called neuromedia—become reality, it may be much more difficult to resist extended belief and knowledge and, with them, massive cognitive bloat.

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