Abstract

In “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition”, Quentin Meillassoux accuses Deleuze of forming a subjectalist philosophical system, that is to say, despite his critiques of subjectivism and representationalism, Deleuze absolutizes the correlation between thought and being, while failing to grasp absolute exteriority. Meillassoux’s main argument in support of this claim is his interpretation of Deleuze’s ideas of “intensity” and “intensive difference” as a “difference of degree” instead of a “difference in nature”. In this paper, I argue against Meillassoux’s reading, and claim that, in his early works, Deleuze constructs a transcendental philosophy very different from Kantian transcendentalism, in which exteriority is graspable through the evental aspects of our experience. Meillassoux accuses Deleuze of being a philosopher of continuity and homogeneity, and believes that the only way to evade subjectalism is by establishing a Cartesian dualism of subjective and objective realms. I claim, however, that Deleuze is the true philosopher of heterogeneity, and that continuity in Deleuze’s thought is simply a means of inducing heterogeneity everywhere. In order to reach the absolute, we do not need to establish a sharp dualism; what we need is a Deleuzian version of transcendental realism, which induces transcendental/empirical distinction everywhere, into both the inorganic and organic realms.