Abstract

In this thesis I explore and endorse this maxim: you can't know P if you are epistemically irresponsible in believing P. Knowing that P is the case, then, sometimes demands more relying on a reliable method in coming to believe P--sometimes one must also understand that one's method is reliable. ;In chapters one and two I try to refute two objections to the claim that irresponsibly held belief cannot be knowledge. The first, Fred Dretske's, states that believing irresponsibly at most prevents one from appropriately claiming to know or, perhaps, from knowing that one knows. The second, Alvin Goldman's, seeks to represent the normative force of our maxim in purely naturalistic terms by defining irresponsible beliefs as those arrived at through unreliable methods. Careful attention to examples demonstrates that neither of these responses is adequate. ;Throughout these two chapters I also assess and reject one plausible grounding for this maxim: the thought that knowers are obliged to avoid irresponsible belief because they are always obliged to investigate the adequacy of their methods. ;In chapter three I draw on an analogy between promise-keeping and knowing that suggests that success in each cannot be the result of being irresponsible. This analogy, I believe, helps articulate our intuitions about how much luck, and what kind, is consistent with our epistemic and moral integrity. The possible payoff, suggested in chapter four, is that we may agree with the sceptic that sometimes an investigation of the propriety of our epistemic methods and habits is required of us--even if there is actually nothing wrong with them--and yet we can still resist the thought that such an investigation is always in place