Abstract

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] The paper deals with the problem of the “two Barbaras” in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic. The problem consists in Aristotle’s differing views on two at a first sight similar in nature syllogisms of mixed assertoric and necessary premises: Barbara LXL and Barbara XLL. The fact that Aristotle believed the first syllogism to be valid and the second one – not, has been received either 1) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be invalid, or 2) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be valid, or 3) positively, by giving a reason why the two Barbaras differ. We commit ourselves to the position by proving that modal propositions for Aristotle have their modalities de dicto and that Aristotelian modal operators act according to their own separate rules where only the type of the modality of a major premise is relevant for the modal status of the conclusion.