Abstract

Numbers and language share a similar structure. Both systems consist of abstract objects used to communicate, to represent, or to make an agreement. While numbers are mainly used for counting and measuring, and language is generally used for speaking and writing, both must follow their respective orders to make sense. If there is a crucial difference between them, it is in the way they position themselves towards that unnamable, uncountable something, that something beyond their knowledge. Lacan calls this something object a. Despite the fact that object a plays a crucial role in the structure of discourse, the term itself can never be adequate to what it represents. Lacan states, “it has to be said that this object is not nameable. If I try to call it surplus jouissance, this is only a device of nomenclature.” Object a must be understood as the concept that names this unnamable something. I will demonstrate that the Lacanian way of dealing with something unnamable is identical to certain mathematical solutions as they approach the limit of representation. I will then explore Lacan’s statement that “there is nothing in common between the subject of knowledge and the subject of the signifier” by way of the basic numerical formulae, 1+1=2 and 1+1=10, both of which represent mathematical truths within their respective systems, the decimal and the binary system. With this distinction, I illustrate the difference between the imaginary knowledge and symbolic knowledge in Lacanian theory