A Skeptic’s Reply to Lewisian Contextualism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):309-332 (2001)
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Abstract

A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know nothing.’ Call this the skeptical use of the word ‘know.’ In apparent contradiction of the skeptic's claims, almost all of us firmly ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. We use the word ‘know’ and its cognates frequently and fluently in largely untroubled communication with our fellows. We make judgments ascribing knowledge to ourselves and others. Furthermore, faced with the same situation and needing to make a judgment about whether to ascribe knowledge or not, we agree on the whole with each other's ascriptions. For the sake of a term, and being careful to neglect any stray connotations it may carry, let us call this the cognitivist use of ‘know.’

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Citations of this work

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Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness.Berislav Marušić - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):60-83.
The Context-Insensitivity of "Knowing More" and "Knowing Better".Igor Douven - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):313-326.

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):317-334.

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