Axiomathes 17 (1):41-51 (2007)

Authors
Daniel D. Novotný
University Of South Bohemia
Abstract
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true
Keywords Physicalism/Naturalism  Reduction  Mind–Body problem  Searle’s ontology
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-006-9003-7
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What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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