Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that a feminist and multidimensional account of forgiveness must take seriously our everyday experience with forgiving, and the nature of the power relationship in which forgiver and forgiven stand. According to my model, forgiveness is a moral act with at least two dimensions, namely the choice to take up, or take seriously, a new attitude toward one's wrongdoer for moral reasons and the performative utterance to the wrongdoer of one's making this choice. It is my position that and are distinct, that either can be discussed as a discreet occasion of forgiveness separately from the other, and the ethical recommendations regarding one of these dimensions can be discussed apart from ethical recommendations regarding the other. ;Mainstream accounts of forgiveness inadequately consider that forgiveness inevitably involves one's relationship with another, and that women and men have disparate experience with forgiveness in their often unequal relations. I argue for a feminist framework which holds we are constituted by our relations , and attends to women's experience with this traditionally feminine virtue. I argue that the statement, "I forgive you," is itself an instance of forgiveness; it is what J. L. Austin calls a performative utterance because more than reporting, truly or falsely, how one feels, saying "I forgive you" performs an act that sets something new in motion, and changes the relation between wrongdoer and victim. I argue for the logical possibility of third-party forgiveness , by which I mean the act of forgiving a wrongdoer for wrongs done to someone other than the forgiving agent. Although 3PF is not a substitute for the forgiveness of victims, it plays an important role in our relationships with the wrongdoers of those with whom we identify. I conclude that both third-party and group forgiveness, like the forgiveness of victims, can be ethically problematic but powerful moral acts