Induction and Hypothesis [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 10 (10):266-267 (1960)
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Abstract

Mr. Barker examines the efforts of Keynes, Reichenbach, Carnap, Williams, Popper, Kemeny and others in their search for the rationale of experimental inference. On what paradigm of reasoning does empirical knowledge depend? Some philosophers suppose it to be induction by enumeration, others induction by elimination, but Mr. Barker sees hope in a modified version of the hypothetico-deductive method. Our knowledge, he explains, forms a’ system ‘in which the fates of various bits are bound together. Philosophers are misled when they speak as if we could confirm a hypothesis that stands alone. Instead, we ought to count one hypothesis better confirmed than its rival ‘if and only if there is some system including the former and the evidence which is somehow than any system including the latter and the evidence’. Here he brings in Kemeny’s ‘logical measure’ of simplicity, read in terms of the number of ways in which two systems of hypotheses can be true in an membered universe. Mr. Barker does not go into the application of this enormous Apparat, nor does he explain the sense of ‘system’ which is supposed to go with his examples of hypotheses, e.g., ‘There’s a cat behind the sofa’.

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