Methodological considerations for the mechanistic explanation of illusory representations in the context of psychopathology

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

A mechanistic explanation is a desired outcome in many studies of perception. Such explanations require discovering the processes that contribute to the realization of a perceptual phenomenon at different levels of information processing. The present analysis aims at investigating the obstacles to develop such mechanistic explanations and their potential solutions in the context of psychopathology. Geometric-Optical Illusions (GOIs) are among perceptual phenomena that have been studied to understand psychopathology in various clinical populations. In the present analysis, the GOIs will be discussed as a methodological tool in the investigation of the mechanistic approach to understanding perception in such populations. I will argue that the fact that most such studies are mainly focused on the investigation of susceptibility to GOIs can only lead to classifying such phenomena or to reporting some correlations between different aspects of such phenomena with certain brain activities, without formulating a mechanistic explanation. The investigation of the variables that mediate perceptual phenomena at earlier stages of information processing is required for the formulation of such explanations. Thus, the objective of the present analysis is twofold: 1) showing how ignoring such variables have prevented the formulation of mechanistic explanations of responses to GOIs in clinical populations, such as schizophrenia and autism, 2) analyzing the methodological aspects of an effective approach in which a top-down guidance based on phenomenological insights (the first-person data) along with the insights provided by the existing theories help overcome obstacles in developing mechanistic explanations of GOIs.

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Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem.F. J. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.

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