O pensamento como criação: Filosofia, Arte e Ciência. O desafio de Deleuze e Guattari

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (4):2415-2438 (2019)
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Abstract

In their last four-handed book, Qu’est ce que la Philosophie?, Deleuze and Guattari support the thesis that philosophy, science and art constitute three different dimensions of thought. Different but complementary. Among them there is no hierarchy or dependency. Deleuze and Guattari state it clearly: “The three ways are specific, as straightforward as each other, and are distinguished by the nature of the plan and what occupies it. To think is to think by concepts, or by functions, or by sensations, and either of these thoughts is no better than the other, or more fully, more completely, more synthetically ‘thought’”. Further, Deleuze and Guattari affirm the creative dimension of thought. “The act of thinking is the only true creation”. Science, art and philosophy thus have in common the fact that they are three creative forms of thought. Now, this article aims at clarifying the meaning of this thesis and at critically proposing an enlargement of its field of application, namely as a way of enlarging the scope and the metaphysical basis of the so-called area of Sci-Art. So, we will try to elucidate the relations between art, science and philosophy thought out by Deleuze and Guattari by gathering a series of concepts. Moreover, we will critically point out the existence of a fundamental ambiguity concerning the status which Deleuze and Guattari end up by granting to philosophy in its relation to science and art. Finally, we will stress the need of enlarging to science and art the transversality attributed by Deleuze and Guattari to philosophy and we will call for another concept so that the relationship between science, art and philosophy can be more deeply though out.

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