Moore's paradox of analysis

Metaphilosophy 2 (4):295–308 (1971)
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Abstract

The nature of conceptual analysis is elucidated by a proposed solution to moore's paradox of analysis. Occurrent, Dispositional, And property concepts are distinguished, And the notion of epistemic gain is introduced and explained. It is shown that although a correct analysis equates property concepts this is done with epistemic gain. It is argued that in a correct analysis there must be no identity between analysans and analysandum in respect to occurrent concepts. The relevance of thought experiments to conceptual analysis is discussed and it is concluded that conceptual analysis consists of a transformation of knowledge how into knowledge that

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References found in this work

A proof that synthetic a priori propositions exist.C. H. Langford - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):20-24.

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