The distinction formalis ex natura rei in the philosophy of Juan Duns Scoto as antecedent of the issue of objectivity

Alpha (Osorno) 41:23-39 (2015)
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Abstract

El artículo intenta presentar y explicar la distinctio formalis ex natura rei, noción que muchos estudiosos han visto como fundamental en la filosofía de Duns Scoto, puesto que a partir de ella se marcaría una importante novedad en relación con las clases de distinciones aristotélicas y tomasianas al tiempo que se inauguraría una nueva metafísica y un original abordaje del acto cognoscitivo. Asimismo, se intentará mostrar cómo la distinción formal se asimilaría al esse intelligibille o esse obiectivum, abriendo así un ámbito intermedio entre lo real y lo inteligible al que podemos denominar objetivo. We attempt to present and explain the distinctio formalis ex-nature rei. a notion that many experts have regarded as fundamental in Duns Scoto´s philosophy, since this would signal an important novelty related Aristotelian and Thomistic types of distinctions, at the time a new metaphysics and an original approach of the cognitive act would emerge. Likewise, we will try to show how the formal distinction would be assimilated to the esse intelligibille or esse obiectivum, thus opening an intermediate area between the real and the intelligible thing which we can name objective.

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