Study of the Problems with Philosophers’ Reflections on the Agency of Vegetable Soul over the Process of Nutrition and Formation of the Body, with Emphasis on Sadrian Thought

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 17 (68):109-128 (2016)
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Abstract

Man’s life begins with nutrition as a process in which an inanimate being or part of it turns into an animate and dynamic being. Reflection on such a process is in the domain of philosophy. The reflections of some philosophers on the issue have shown that in this process a body which is the source of nutrition changes in terms of substance and property and resembles the nourishing body to lead to the formation of life and body. Philosophers believe that vegetable soul is influential agent by nature in this process. Their explanation, however, causes some problems: 1. this act does not have the conditions of a natural act; 2. vegetable soul is physical and molded in material, and, according to their view, body and physical has no independent effect on another thing; 3. philosophers’ view about vegetable soul is ambiguous; and 4. vegetable soul is not actualized at the start of a person’s life to be influential in this process. Since philosophers have not provided clear answers to these problems, the present paper have found answers to some of these problems by analyzing the implicit requirements of their theory. The solutions provided by prior philosophers lead to the ineffectiveness of the powers of intellective soul or entrusting the natural act. However, using Mulla Sadra’s theory of substantial motion to reform Nasir al-din Tusi can help us to explain the governance of body at the start of life; or using the theory of archetypes can help us to solve both the aforementioned problem and the problem of physicality of vegetable soul. Finally, the paper theorizes that nutrition is not a natural act and that combining Tusi’s theory with Mulla Sadra’s theory of compulsive act provides another solution which does not lead to the problem of entrusting.

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