Is Morality Open to the Free Will Skeptic?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (3) (2023)
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Abstract

The primary aim of this essay is to consider whether free will skeptics’ assertions of moral claims pertaining to human agents and their actions are consistent with the rejection of the kind of moral responsibility—namely, that which requires free will—that is espoused by virtually all of them. In order to address this issue, I will examine one of the most well-known and detailed defenses of morality by a free will skeptic; namely, that provided by Derk Pereboom in his book Living without Free Will. I conclude that free will skeptics should dispense with making any moral assertions with regard to human agents or their actions since doing so does little more than muddy up the conceptual waters by recasting moral terms in ways that are at odds with their traditional or folk usage.​

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