Abstract

The methodological premise of the investigation is the meta-difference between foreground and background as a necessary element of any difference, including the difference between conceptual and terminological types of analysis of philosophical texts. The topic of terminological analysis is the function of the terms that make up the framework of concepts, the methods and justifications for their introduction. The role of D.Hume, who was the first to draw attention to the difference in the meaning of the same word in natural and philosophical languages, is noted. More general questions are formulated regarding the prerequisites of terminological analysis: what is a term, what experience underlies the very process of introducing terms, are terms a necessary building material of philosophical texts or a necessary evil? The prerequisites for terminological analysis include the differences between a term and a word, as well as a term and a metaphor. Husserl’s concept of noetic-noematic structures is considered in terms of the difference between conceptual and terminological dimensions. The research focuses on the functions of “sense” as an intermediary between natural language and philosophical terminology. The prerequisites for the introduction of the terms “noesis” and “noema” are identified; in the first case, this is the traditional scheme of hylomorphism, in the second, the postulate of the identity of what is perceived during normal and abnormal perception. A comparison is made between Husserl’s expression “sense does not burn” with M.Bulgakov’s aphorism “manuscripts do not burn.” Husserl’s division of two types of consciousness (positional and neutral or shadow) reveals the incorrectness of Husserl’s description of the difference between the foreground and background of perception. Husserl’s description of “neutralization” is subjected to critical analysis using the example of the perception of Durer’s engraving. The final section of the article examines attempts to correlate the meaning of the word “sense” with experience, compares the role of the terms “sense” and “concept,” and also analyzes Husserl’s “generalization of the idea of meaning,” or expansion of the meaning of the term “sense.” Finally, a distinction is made between a methodology of separation, which corresponds to the boundary-setting function of terms, and a methodology of differentiation of differences, which implies the differentiating function of terms.