Abstract

This chapter discusses various attempts at deriving metaethical conclusions from claims about the function of morality. In doing so, it will, for the most part, grant the truth of such function claims and focus on what metaethical theses they do and do not support. After briefly surveying various recent proposals that rely on functions claims in an attempt to debunk the possibility of robust moral truth and knowledge, the chapter focusses on the contrary, vindicatory project. The proponents of this project argue that a proper understanding of morality’s function not only supports the idea that there are moral truths that we can gain knowledge of, but also provides us with a better understanding of the grounds of those truths, an understanding, moreover, that reconciles the existence of such truths with a naturalistic worldview. A critical assessment of their proposals reveals that while a promising vindicatory role for a function claim can be found in elaborating a non-representationalist conception of the truth of moral judgments, grounding moral truth in morality’s function in that way allows for naturalizing ethics in a modest sense at the most.