Abstract

The work of Rainer Forst constitutes the third generation of the Habermasian School. In Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung [The right to justification] (2007) Forst develops a constructivist approach to justice in a serious effort to find a systematic basis for ‘critical theory’. In this article the relevant arguments of this approach are critically analysed. The position developed in the work of Forst appears to be characterized by a fundamental ambiguity because it oscillates between two irreconcilable points. On the one hand Forst seems to admit the necessity of something like the ‘unconditionality of moral law’ presupposing a kind of Kantian transcendentalism beyond constructivism. But on the other hand, he turns back to a more Habermasian constructivist or proceduralist theory. The ambiguity implicit in Forst’s philosophy is that it does not find a compromise between these two approaches to discursive theory so it fluctuates between them, needing the logical support of both poles