Smith's defence of approximate truth
AbstractThe example can be generalized. Suppose that ϕ and ψ are suffi- ciently different functions of an independent variable t. We may show that whenever X’s predictions for ϕ and ψ lie (weakly) between Z’s predictions and T’s predictions (the true values), then there are other quantities, interdefinable with ϕ and ψ, that reverse the ordering.
Similar books and articles
Approximate Truth and Confirmation.Robert John Schwartz - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):606-610.
Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades.Shelby D. Hunt - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.
Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories.Peter Smith - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277.
Using Scott Domains to Explicate the Notions of Approximate and Idealized Data.Ronald Laymon - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):194-221.
Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth.Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation.Eric Barnes - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.
Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations From Art.Anjan Chakravartty - 2010 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science:33-50.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads