II—Ruth Garrett Millikan: Loosing the Word–Concept Tie

Abstract

Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claiming that individual concepts are possessed only by individual people. Concepts are classified rather than identified across different people

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Ruth Millikan
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.

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