Have incommensurability and causal theory of reference anything to do with actual science?—Incommensurability, no; causal theory, yes

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):97 – 108 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I propose to support these replies with actual episodes in late nineteenth and twentieth century physics. The historical record reveals that meaning does change but not in the Kuhnian manner which is tied to descriptive theories of meaning. A necessary part of this discussion is commentary on realist versus antirealist conceptions of science

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,853

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Newton’s Dynamics, Kuhn, and Incommensurability.Eduardo H. Flichman - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 10:89-96.
Is essentialism unscientific?Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):493-510.
Is Putnam's causal theory of meaning compatible with internal realism?Valer Ambrus - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):1-16.
Taxonomic incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1):7 – 16.
Kuhn on reference and essence.Alexander Bird - 2004 - Philosophia Scientiae 8 (1):39-71.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-01

Downloads
52 (#306,373)

6 months
7 (#430,488)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Rethinking the ‘Discovery’ of the electron.Theodore Arabatzis - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27 (4):405-435.
Rethinking the 'Discovery' of the electron.Theodore Arabatzis - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27 (4):405-435.
Neutral currents and the history of scientific ideas.Arthur I. Miller & Frederick W. Bullock - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (6):895-931.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Meaning and the moral sciences.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
The inference to the best explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.

View all 18 references / Add more references