Abstract

This theoretical dissertation proposes that the evolution of cooperation shaped the evolution of human theory of mind, and the reverse. Following reviews of the relevant primatological and developmental literatures, it is argued that, in the context of group selection for cooperation within hominid groups, theory of mind acquired a cooperative dimension as mind-reading came to be augmented by the "publication" of cues indicative of states of belief, desire, and intent. In this way, hominids came to sometimes help one another to understand and anticipate behavior in terms of an extant representational system of intentional states. It is further argued that cooperative theory of mind was foundational to the evolution of human language and human culture, and that deficits in cooperative theory of mind may underlie forms of psychopathology such as psychopathy and schizophrenia. Lastly, it is argued that cooperative theory of mind has implications for philosophical problems concerning the place of intentionality in the natural world. In view of the thesis of cooperative theory of mind, it is argued that Dennett's "intentional stance" is better described as an "intentional dance," through which we cooperatively give and receive moves that convey co-representations of intentionality