Abstract
This volume contains papers in which Hans Kelsen addresses a number of philosophical issues that are crucial to his defense of the pure theory of law. Although it includes some papers appearing in English for the first time, this collection differs little in scope or substance from an earlier one, What is Justice? Kelsen’s legal theory has raised the ire of critics because they believe it separates far too sharply law from ethics. In these papers, especially those written in recent years, Kelsen contends that the separation he proposes does not eliminate the possibility of criticizing the law on moral grounds; but, since there is often no agreement on moral beliefs or any means of establishing their correctness, it is often necessary to support or validate a legal system on a nonmoral basis. Thus, many of these papers deal with Kelsen’s concept of a norm and the means by which the basic norm, the one which validates all others, can be validated. Kelsen’s much criticized contention that the basic norm can be validated by a principle of minimum effectiveness is stated in a number of papers; these various statements may help to clarify the nature of the validation that he believes to be sufficient. Moral philosophers, who have generally ignored Kelsen’s work, will discover that he has much to say on moral relativism and natural law. Kelsen’s belief in the relativity of moral value, a belief he held to be quite different from the denial of any values, is used to support both his rejection of natural law and his contention that a valid legal order need not be in accord with any particular moral order. Along with papers dealing with the validation of norms and moral relativism, there are papers dealing with causality and accountability, God and the State, and the principle of retribution. There is a brief, helpful introduction by Ota Weinberger.—M.G.