Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue for a realist metaphysics in an unusual way. I do not contend that realism is the only viable metaphysics. In fact, I argue that it is not. I do not argue for realism on the grounds that it correctly describes what is ultimately and objectively the case. Instead, I argue for realism on the grounds that it makes the best sense of our practices. I view the choice of a metaphysics as a practical choice about how to talk about our theorizing. ;Realism maintains that there is a single way that the world is that is independent of us. This assertion involves three distinct claims. It involves the claim that there is a structure to the world; that there is only one such structure; and that this unique structure is independent of us. I define realism as any position that is committed to all three of these claims. Consequently, any position that denies any one of these three claims is a non-realist position. ;Since for any collection of predicates, the world affords a satisfaction pattern for those predicates, being restrictive about structures requires being restrictive about which predicates are such that their satisfaction pattern defines a structure. Thus, the realist, who claims that there is only one such structure to the world, needs to be quite restrictive concerning just which predicates are structure-defining. Because the realist is committed to the structure being independent of us, the structure-defining nature of predicates must likewise be independent of us. Non-realists are typically less restrictive about which predicates are eligible for defining structures of the world. ;A popular, and rather immediate, objection to non-realism is that by denying the existence of an independent structure of the world non-realism cannot make adequate sense of the empirical nature of science. If this objection to non-realism is correct, then non-realism is doomed from the very start since an adequate account of science is absolutely mandatory for any metaphysics. I argue that contrary to the charges of many realists, many different forms of non-realism can make as much sense of the empirical nature of scientific theorizing as realism can. ;I also argue against the most influential objections to realism. One such charge is that realism produces new skeptical problems. Note that, according to realism, the way that the world is depends, in part, on which properties are structure-defining. Since we do not have epistemic access to facts about which properties are structure-defining, we ipso facto cannot have epistemic access to the structure that such properties define. Thus realism is alleged to render reality utterly unknowable. This is a mistake. Realism merely maintains that certain age-old skepticisms are genuine possibilities. ;One might argue that non-realism is preferable to realism in virtue of solving or avoiding these traditional skeptical problems. First, the non-realist does not solve these problems, but rather avoids them by making sense of our practices without the realist presuppositions of traditional skepticisms. Second, it is unclear whether such a solution is any better than a skepticism that we, as realists, simply refuse to worry about. Hence, although one can reasonably prefer non-realism to realism because of its treatment of skepticism, I argue that one need not do so. Ultimately, I argue that, all things considered, realism is the best metaphysical system going