Perceptual Capacities: Questions for Schellenberg

Analysis 79 (4):730-739 (2019)
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Abstract

According to Schellenberg’s capacitism, perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out particulars, including objects, events and property instances. To say that perception is so constituted, for her, is to say that perceptual states have the content, phenomenal character, and evidential force they do in virtue of the fact that they are yielded by employing perceptual capacities.1 1

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10.1093/analys/anz033

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Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

The Unity of Perceptual Content.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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References found in this work

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

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