Abstract

Theories of hermeneutics -- the study of interpretation -- have been used both to support and to reject the division of the natural and human sciences. Wilhelm Dilthey and Charles Taylor defend that divide, while Richard Rorty and Clifford Geertz have contested its validity. The arguments of Dilthey and Taylor stem from the classical hermeneutical tradition founded by Friedrich Schleiermacher. On the other hand, Rorty and Geertz have claimed support for their position from the philosophical hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. In this thesis, however, I argue that the confrontation between Dilthey and Heidegger has been misconceived. Geertz and Rorty are actually committed to the same hermeneutical principles as Dilthey and Taylor, which makes their rejection of a divide between the sciences an "extraordinary reversal." Once the history of hermeneutics has been clarified and its central figures properly characterized, I argue that Dilthey and Heidegger probably would have agreed about the former' s divorce of the sciences. I also argue that Geertz and Rorty are more committed to that division than they themselves may readily admit